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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State, in its Respondent's Brief, has conceded that it was error for the district
court to modify the underlying terms of Mr. Bosier's probation so that his probation
would commence at a later date than that indicated in his original judgment of conviction
and sentence wherein Mr. Bosier was originally placed on probation.
Respondent's Brief, p.9 n.1.)

(See

Therefore, the only remaining issue for this Court's

resolution is whether the district court lacked the authority to also alter Mr. Bosier's
underlying judgment of conviction and sentence so that his underlying sentence for
possession of a controlled substance would run consecutively to his sentences arising
from Canyon County.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the remaining contentions of the State
regarding the district court's alteration to Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Bosier's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court lack jurisdiction in this case to alter Mr. Bosier's underlying
sentence upon remand from the ldaho Court of Appeals specifically directing the
district court to reinstate "the original probation" as ordered in Mr. Bosier's
original judgment of conviction and sentence?

2.

Did the district court err when it increased the aggregate term of Mr. Bosier's
sentence through filing an amended judgment of conviction and sentence when
the ldaho Court of Appeals did not vacate Mr. Bosier's original judgment of
conviction and sentence?

3.

Did the district court impose a vindictive sentence when it increased the
aggregate term of Mr. Bosier's judgment of conviction and sentence upon
Mr. Bosier's successful appeal?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction In This Case To Alter Mr. Bosier's Underlving
Sentence Upon Remand From The ldaho Court Of Appeals Specifically Directing The
District Court To Reinstate "The Original Probation" As Ordered In Mr. Bosier's Original
Judgment Of Conviction And Sentence
In response to Mr. Bosier's assertion that the district court exceeded the scope of
its jurisdiction upon remand, and therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to take
action in the form of altering Mr. Bosier's judgment of conviction and sentence, the State
makes two primary arguments. First, the State asserts that Mr. Bosier has not provided
"authority for the proposition that the issue of a court exceeding its authority on remand
is a jurisdictional issue." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) Second, the State asserts that the
district court had the authority to alter the original judgment of conviction and sentence
because doing so was only addressing a matter previously overlooked by the district
court at Mr. Bosier's original sentencing. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) The State's
assertions, however, lack merit.
Although the State argues that Mr. Bosier failed to present legal authority in
support of his assertion that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to alter
Mr. Bosier's underlying judgment of conviction and sentence, which was left intact by
the Court of Appeals' prior Opinion in Mr. Bosier's case, this argument ignores the legal
authorities already presented in Mr. Bosier's Appellant's Brief. The ldaho Supreme
Court in State v. Hosey, which was one of the cases relied on by Mr. Bosier, expressly
referred the determination of the district court's authority to take action upon remand of
a case as one of "the trial court's jurisdiction on remand." State v. Hosey, 134 ldaho
883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000) (see also Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) The Opinion

in Hummer v. Evans, also relied upon in the Appellant's Brief, makes this point even
more clear

- it is the

language of the remittitur that directs whether the district court

retains any continuing and vested subject matter jurisdiction in a case. Hummer
Evans, 132 ldaho 830, 833, 979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999).
appellate court is merely to enter a judgment

V.

If the directive of the

- or, as in this case, reinstate the original

judgment of conviction and order of probation -then this is merely a ministerial task that
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the district court to litigate or make
substantive alterations outside of the directive of the appellate court. Id. (see also
Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)
Mr. Bosier further relied both on the cases of Sfate v. Rogers and Sfafe

v.

Jakoski in support of his jurisdictional argument. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) Both of
these opinions provide that, "Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial
court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment
on appeal." Sfate v. Rogers, 140 ldaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004); State v.
Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (emphasis added). Moreover,
the ldaho Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong, which was also relied upon by
Mr. Bosier in his Appellant's Brief, extensively analyzed and determined that the above
quoted holding represented a statement of limitation specifically on the subject matter
jurisdiction of the district court. Stafe v. Armstrong, 146 ldaho 372, 377-378, 195 P.3d
731, 736-737 (Ct. App. 2008) (see also Appellant's Brief, p.7). Given this, the State's
claim that Mr. Bosier has provided "no authority for the proposition that the issue of a

court exceeding its authority on remand is a jurisdictional issue" is without merit. (See
Respondent's Brief, p.7.)
The State's alternative argument is that the district court, in altering Mr. Bosier's
underlying sentence, was merely effectuating the district court's original intent and
providing for an absent term. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-11.) These arguments fail for
two reasons. First, the State cites to no evidence in the record in support of any
indication of the district court's original intent at sentencing; and the record actually
discloses that the district court had earlier held the opposite intent. But, more important
for this Court, the State is wrong in its suggestion that Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence
was not altered, as the default position by statute in Idaho is that a sentence ordered
into execution is sewed concurrently to a prior sentence unless the district court
expressly orders the sentence to run consecutively.
With regard to the State's post-hoc postulation as to the district court's intent at
sentencing, this assertion is without support in the record. The statements made by the
district court, and relied on by the State, indicate solely the district court's present
intention at the time of re-sentencing Mr. Bosier after he had successfully challenged
the district court's prior action of sua sponte revoking Mr. Bosier's probation. (Tr., p.6,
L.19 - p.7, L.5.) This new-found intention cannot be imputed retroactively to the district
court at Mr. Bosier's original sentencing.
Moreover, the record in this case actually demonstrates that the district court's
initial disposition towards the Canyon County sentences was the opposite of what the
district court eventually ordered upon remand from Mr. Bosier's prior successful appeal.
Upon learning of Mr. Bosier's underlying sentences in the Canyon County cases after

Mr. Bosier had been placed on probation, the district court, upon improperly revoking
his probation, ordered that Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence would "run concurrent with
the other cases that have him in the penitentiary." (34745 Tr., p.33, ~s.16-21.') It is
very clear that the district court intended this to include the Canyon County cases, since
the district court explicitly referenced the Canyon County case numbers and the dates
upon which those sentences would be completed thereafter. (34745 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-9.)
The Amended Judgment of Conviction and Sentence ordered upon revocation of
Mr. Bosier's probation likewise reflects the district court's disposition that his underlying
sentence should be served "concurrently wifh aN other cases currently being senled and
said term to commence immediately." (34547 R., p.54) (emphasis added.) While the
prior Court of Appeals' opinion in this case vacated all but Mr. Bosier's original judgment
of conviction and sentence, the record nevertheless reflects that the district court
originally entertained the opposite disposition regarding whether Mr. Bosier's underlying
sentence should be served consecutively or concurrently to those arising from Canyon
County

-

and that the district court's intention only changed after Mr. Bosier's

successful appeal.
That being said, the intent of the district court is irrelevant, as under Idaho's
statutory scheme a criminal sentence is presumed to commence immediately, and
therefore be served concurrently with all other sentences for which a defendant may

1

The prior appellate record from Mr. Bosier's previous appeal, designated ldaho
Supreme Court Case No. 34745, has already been augmented into the record for
Mr. Bosier's present appeal via the ldaho Supreme Court's Order Augmenting Appeal
Record entered on June 29, 2009. (R., pp.3-4.) As such, any portions of the transcript
or clerk's record from the prior appeal are cited to herein with reference to Mr. Bosier's
prior Supreme Court case number.

already be serving time unless the district court specifically orders that the sentence is
to be served consecutively. ldaho Code section 18-309, in addition to delineating when
a defendant is entitled to credit for pre-judgment incarceration, provides that a term of
incarceration that is ordered by the district court "commences upon the pronouncement
of sentence." I.C. § 18-309. By its plain language, the default provision for a criminal
sentence is that it commences to be served immediately. A district court at sentencing
does have the discretion to alter this default provision, and provide that a sentence does
not commence to be served until a prior sentence has been satisfied. See, e.g.,
I.C. § 18-308; State v. Mead, 145 ldaho 378, 382, 179 P.3d 341, 345 (Ct. App. 2008).
However, in absence of such a declaration, under Idaho's statutory scheme, the term of
a defendant's sentence begins to commence upon the pronouncement and execution of
his or her sentence by default.
Given this, the district court's alteration of the terms and conditions of
Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence, providing that his sentence would not begin to
commence until after he had served his Canyon County sentences, represented a
substantive alteration of Mr. Bosier's original judgment of conviction and sentence, and
was further an unlawful increase of that sentence. (See R., p.12; 34745 R., p.43.)

The District Court Erred When It Increased The Aqqreaate Term Of Mr. Bosier's
Sentence Throuqh Filinq An Amended Judgment Of Conviction And Sentence When
The ldaho Court Of Appeals Did Not Vacate Mr. Bosier's Original Judqment Of
Conviction And Sentence
While the issue of whether the district court erred by increasing Mr. Bosier's
sentence was not separately addressed in the State's brief, the State implicitly argues

that Mr. Bosier's sentence was not increased because he "has failed to show that he
had the presumption of a concurrent sentence." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) Contrary to
the State's implication, unless the district court expressly orders that a sentence shall
run consecutively to a prior ordered sentence, the default provision in Idaho is that a
sentence of incarceration commences to run upon entry of the judgment of conviction.
See I.C. § 18-309 (term of incarceration "commences upon pronouncement of
sentence"). As such, under the original terms and conditions of Mr. Bosier's underlying
sentence, this sentence would be presumed to commence to run upon being executed
by the district court. Additionally, as noted in the Appellant's Brief, an alteration of a
sentence from being served concurrently with another sentence to being served
consecutively does operate as an increase of the sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1314.)

Therefore, when the district court altered Mr. Bosier's original judgment of

conviction and sentence in order to provide that Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence was to
run consecutively to his sentences arising from Canyon County, the district court
increased the aggregate term of the sentence that was originally set forth in Mr. Bosier's
initial judgment of conviction and sentence that was left in force by the Court of Appeals'
opinion in this case.

The District Court Imposed A Vindictive Sentence When It Increased The Aqareqate
Term Of Mr. Bosier's Judclment Of Conviction And Sentence Upon Mr. Bosier's
Successful Appeal
As with Mr. Bosier's other assertions on appeal, the State has responded to
Mr. Bosier's contention that the district court sentenced him vindictively upon remand,
and thereby abused its discretion, by asserting that the district court did not increase

Mr. Bosier's sentence upon remand.

(Respondent's Brief, p.12.)

The State also

suggests that the district court was merely effectuating the court's intent at sentencing.
(Respondent's Brief, p.12.)
However, it is particularly salient to the issue of Mr. Bosier's vindictive sentencing
claim to note that the district court, even after learning of Mr. Bosier's underlying
Canyon County sentences, had originally determined that it was appropriate for
Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence in this case to run concurrently with his sentences
from Canyon County. (34745 Tr., p.33, L.16

- p.34, L.9;34745 R., p.54.)

It is also

apparent from the record, and the State does not dispute, that the only new information
that was before the district court when it attempted to resentence Mr. Bosier upon
remand was the fact that Mr. Bosier had successfully appealed the district court's prior
action of sua sponte revoking his probation. (Tr., p.1, Ls.3-25.) As such, it would
appear that the district court affirmatively altered its position regarding whether
Mr. Bosier's sentence should be served consecutively or concurrently to his sentences
arising out of Canyon County, not that the district court had originally intended to order
these sentences to run consecutively from the outset. And the district court's position
only changed upon Mr. Bosier's prior successful challenge on appeal in this case.
Moreover, as has been previously noted, the default provision in Idaho is that a
sentence begins to be served immediately upon execution, and that the district court
must exercise its discretion by affirmatively ordering a sentence to run consecutive to a
prior sentence in order to disturb the default provision. I.C. §§ 18-308, 18-309; see also
Points I & 11, supra. Given this, the district court imposed a vindictive sentence when it

increased the aggregate portion of Mr. Bosier's underlying sentence following
Mr. Bosier's successful appeal of the revocation of his probation.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Bosier respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's Third
Amended Judgment of Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence, and remand this
case with instructions to the district court to re-instate Mr. Bosier on probation under his
original Judgment of Conviction and Order Suspending Sentence that was entered by
the district court on October 5, 2007.
DATED this 24thday of May, 2010.

SARAH E. TOMP~INS-)
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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